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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JANICE C. MARTIN, Widow,
GAYLYNN MARTIN, MICHELLE MARTIN, GARY
CHADWICK, and VAL JAMES
MARTIN, Minors by and
through their Guardian Ad
Litem, JANICE C. MARTIN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
LYNN D. CHRISTENSEN and
FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, a California
Corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case oN.
11450

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff, Janice C. Martin, was injured and
her husband, Gary Martin, fatally injured in a motor
vehicle pedestrian accident that occurred December
1, 1967, in Salt Lake County, Utah. The driver of the
vehicle, Lynn D. Christensen, who is a defendant in
this action, was an uninsured motorist. At the time
of this accident, Gary Martin owned two motor vehicles and each vehicle was insured by the Farmers
Insurance Exchange for uninsured motorist coverage. Two policies identical in language had been
issued by the Farmers Insurance Exchange - the
1

only difference being the automobile described in
each policy and the premium. The sole question presented by this case is the amount of insurance coverage available to plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Janice C. Martin on behalf of herself and as
guardian of her minor children commenced suit in
the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking damages for her personal injuries and damages for the
death of her husband against Lynn D. Christensen
and the Farmers Insurance Exchange. As noted
above, Lynn D. Christensen, was an uninsured motorist and the Farmers Insurance Exchange provides
uninsured motorist coverage on two vehicles owned
by decedent, Gary Martin.
The complaint of plaintiff (R. 1-4) does not
clearly specify the real issue in this case, but simply
asks for judgment in the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty Thousand ($250,000) Dollars for the death of
Gary Martin and Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
( $250,000) Dollars for the injuries to Janice C.
Martin. The uninsured motorist, Lynn D. Christensen, did not answer or otherwise appear in the action.
Defendant, (respondent) Farmers Insurance Exchange answered the complaint of the plaintiff; admitted that it provided uninsured motorist coverage
to plaintiffs; denied generally the other allegations of
the complaint; and specifically requested that the
Court determine and declare that the amount of un2

1

insured motorist coverage available to plaintiffs under their contract with Farmers Insurance Exchange
was limited to Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars for
the death of Gary Martin, and Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars for injuries sustained by Janice C.
Martin ( R 5-8). At the same time, respondent, Farmers Insurance Exchange, offered to permit a judgment to be entered against it in the amount of
Twenty Thousand ( $20,000) Dollars, the amount of
coverage it claimed owing to plaintiffs (R. 16) and
moved the Court for a Summary Judgment declaring
that the total amount of Twenty Thousand ( $20,000)
Dollars was the ultimate legal responsibility of
Farmers Insurance Exchange to plaintiffs. Thereupon the plaintiffs moved the Court for a Summary
Judgment (R 18) asking the Court to hold that the
ultimate legal responsibility of the Farmers Insurance Exchange was Forty Thousand ($40,000) Dollars. The real issue in the case was thus joined.
Based upon the clear unequivocal language of
the contractual provisions of the two insurance contracts, the Lower Court granted the Motion of Farmers Insurance Exchange. Plaintiffs prosecute this
Appeal from that Order and Judgment.

3

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the Judgment and
Judgment in their favor as a matter of Law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the facts
stated in the Brief of Appellant. However, Respondent does not agree with the conclusion stated therein
that the Lower Court erred in granting Respondents
Motion for Summary Judgment. On the contrary as
will be pointed out in the Points of Argument, the
Judgment of the Lower Court is correct.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE HOLDING THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT
OF INSURANCE COVERAGE AVAILABLE WAS TEN
THOUSAND ($10,000) DOLLARS FOR A SINGLE INJURY AND TWENTY THOUSAND ($20,000) DOLLARS
FOR A SINGLE ACCIDENT.

As noted above and in the Brief of Appellant,
Gary Martin owned two automobiles and each was
insured by Farmers Insurance Exchange under separate insurance contracts, identical however, in their
terms. Each of the policies issued to Gary Martin
contained General Conditions. The condition pertinent to the legal question in this case reads:
(7) OTHER INSURANCE IN THE COMPANY
"With respect to any occurrence, accident or loss
to which this and any other insurance policy or
policies issued to the insured by the Company
also apply, no payment shall be made hereunder
which, when added to any amount paid or payable under such other insurance policy or policies, wo uld result in a total payment to the insured or any other person in excess of the highest applicable limit of liability under any one
such policy." (R. 13-15)
The language of the quoted condition is clear
and unequivocal. It says very succinctly and precisely
that if an insured has other applicable coverage with
the company that payment for loss shall not exceed
5

the single highest limit under any one policy. It is '
admitted by plaintiffs that both policies issued
to Gary Martin had identical uninsured motorist
coverage and that each policy contains the condition
set forth above.

The quoted condition is not unique to the policies
issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Exchange.
This condition, or one of similar import, is contained
in every automobile liability policy written in this
Country. There may be some exceptions but Respon- '
dent has not been able to locate any. The Court will
find that automobile liability insurance contracts will
generally follow a standard form in use throughout
the insurance industry. From time to time, over the
years, the standard form will be changed to meet
changing coverages and changing conditions. These
various standard policies have been compiled in a
work by Risjord and Austin entitled "Automobile
Liability Insurance Cases." The condition we quote
above came into being in the 1959 standard policy.
As a matter of common knowledge we know that over
the years it has become customary for the average
American family to have two and perhaps more cars
in the family. It is also very usual and standard for
these family automobiles to be insured by the same
insurance company. The reason is that it is convenient for a family to deal with one insurance agent
and in most cases, as was the case here, the family
receives a discount when more than one automobile
is insured with the company. In the Martin case on

1
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Policy No. 6643-00-14, the single car premium was
$67.80; with the second car discount the premium
was $52.52. On Policy No. 6643-12-14, the single car
premium is $72.10 and with the second car discount
the premium was $61.70.
The quoted condition was adopted to specifically
meet the growing situation where there was more
than one automobile in the family and to prevent
multiple or pyramiding insurance limits. An illustration at this point may be helpful. Assume a person
is driving a borrowed vehicle with the permission
of the owner. This driver also has two vehicles of
his own insured by the same insurance company under separate policies. He gets in an accident and
causes personal injuries to the driver of another vehicle. Assume further that there is Ten Thousand
($10,000) Dollars coverage on the vehicle he is driving and Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars coverage
on each of his automobiles. It is uniformly held that
the coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident is
primary and that other insurance on the driver is
excess. But, the further question in this illustration
is just how much excess insurance is there? Does the
insurance on just one of the vehicles owned by the
driver apply, or, does the insurance on both vehicles
apply? The insurance industry elected to resolve this
question by the adoption of contractual language
of the quoted condition. In the illustration given,
under the language of the condition, the insured
driver would have available to him the coverage on
7

the vehicle he was operating as well as the highest
single limit on the two vehicles he owns.
As indicated, the purpose of the condition is to
resolve in advance any question that might arise concerning the amount of coverage available where the
insured has more than one car insured in the company.
So far as can be now ascertained this insurance
condition Jias never been before a Court of Last Resort in this Country. The decision of this Court then,
concerning this condition, will be a "landmark" decision and certainly of more than a passing interest
to the insurance industry.
Respondent does not view the problem in this
case as one of construction or interpretation of
language. The language of the condition is very clear
and very understandable. The issue is whether the
Respondent, and for that matter the insurance industry, has a right to limit its ultimate liability for a
single loss.
The applicable general textbook authority is
set forth in Volume 29, American Jurisprudence
(Insurance-Section 227.) It reads:
"In the absence of a statutory provision to the
contrary, an insurance company may limit its
liability and impose restrictions and limitations
on its contractual obligations not inconsistent
with public policy."
This general principle has been approved in numerous jurisdictions.
8
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The Utah case of Jones vs. New York Life, 69
Utah, 172, 253 Pac. 200, involved an application for
a life insurance policy. The proposed insured in this
case had completed an application and had been examined by a doctor. He was approved by the company for a policy and the policy had actually been
issued and delivered to the agent. However, before
the premium had been paid the proposed insured had
been examined by a doctor and it was found that he
was suffering from meningitis and that he died within a few days thereafter. The application provided
that there would be no insurance if the proposed insured had consulted a physician prior to the payment
of the premium. The Court ruled that insurance contract had not come into force by reason of the breach
of conditions set forth in the application. The Court
stated in part:

"It was within the rights of, and was competent
for, the parties to provide in the application under what conditions and at what time the policy
should become effective."
Certainly if an insurance company can legally
contract and condition the effect of its policy of insurance it has the legal power to limit the extent and
amount of liability for which it will be responsible.

New York Li/e vs. West, 82 Pac. 2d, 754
(Colo.):

"It seems clear to us that it is within neither the
intention nor the power of the Legislature or the
Courts to compel an insurance company to write
9

a J?Olicy, or preve~t it fr?m limiting a policy
written to any specific accident or class of accidents."
C.P.A. Company vs. Jones, 263 Pac. 2d, 731
(Okla.)
"It is well established that an insurance company may limit the risks for which it is responsible."
Trinity Universal Insurance Company vs. Willrich, 124 Pac. 2d, 950 (Wash.)

"The relation between an insurer and an insured
is purely a contractual one.... It is axiomatic
that competent persons may make such a contract for insurance as they may see fit, provided
that it does not contravene any provision of statutory law and is not opposed to public policy ....
It follows, therefore, that in the absence of some
statutory provision to the contrary, an insurance
company may seek to limit its liability and to
impose restrictions and limitations upon its contractual obligations not inconsistent with public
policy."
The undoubted right of the insurance company
to limit its liability is conditioned only upon considerations of public policy or statutory law.
At this point it is well to consider the Utah case
of Russell vs. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d, 157, 417 Pac. 2d,
658, which is an uninsured motorist coverage case
and is clearly analogous to the case at bar. In that
case a passenger in a vehicle was injured by an uninsured motorist. There was uninsured motorist cov10

erage on the vehicle in which she was riding and she
was also entitled to the same type of coverage on her
family automobile. The insurer on the automobile
in which she was riding settled her claim for $4,500
without answering the suit. She thereupon obtained
a default judgment against the administrator of the
estate of the uninsured motorist in the amount of
$10,000. Summary judgment was granted to the
plaintiff against her own insurer for the sum of
$5.000.
On appeal this Court reversed the summary
judgment and in its holding extensively discussed
the "excess clause" and "pro-rata clause" contained
in the two insurance policies. The Court stated in
part:
"The reasoning of the Oregon Court is persuasive, but we are constrained to adopt the majority
rule which imposes primary liability of the "prorata Insurer" and secondary liability on the "excess insurer".'
The Court stated further:
This Court has seriously considered the reasoning in both the Smith and Burcham cases and
can find no compelling reason for departing from
the majority rule as stated in Burcham. The
applicable limits of liability in both Russell's and
Gritton's policy were $5,000 per person. Thus
the applicable limits of the Russell policy did not
exceed the applicable limits of Gritton's policy.
The language is free and clear of ambiguity,
that since the limits of Russell's policy did not
exceed Gritton's excess coverage cannot be applied in Russell's pdlicy."
11

In so holding this Court cited with approval,
language from the leading case of Burcham vs.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 121 No. West, 2d 500
(1963 - Iowa.)
Discussing the majority rule preferring the
excess clause over the pro-rata clause, our Court
quotes the Burcham case, supra, as fallows:
"The basis for so holding is not always clear. It
may, however, be justified on what is a rational
basis of the intent of the insurance industry in
its use of such clauses to set up order of payment and limit amounts payable to prevent double recovery."
Our Court is with the majority of Courts in the
interpretation and effect given the "excess clause"
and the "pro-rata clause" contained in automobile
liability insurance policy. The effect of "Condition 7"
in the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy is to reach
the same result where the same insurance company
issues two policies to the same person or family as
where two different insurance companies cover the
same loss and their rights and responsibilities are set
forth in the "excess and pro-rata clauses."
Respondent submits that the reasoning of the
Russell case, supra, quoting extensively from the
Iowa case of Burcham, supra, is controlling on the
case at bar. To reverse the Lower Court would be
to cast doubt upon the reasoning of the Russell case
supra. Respondent is asking the Court to affirm the
judgment of the Lower Court.
12
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"on what is a rational basis of the intent of the
insurance industry in its use of such clauses
(Condition 7) to set up order of payment and
limit amounts payable to prevent double recovery."

13

POINT II.
CONDITION 7 OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
DOES NOT VIOLATE UTAH LAW OR CONTRAVENE
THE ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE.

As indicated under the preceding Point an insurance company may legally limit its liability subject only to positive statutory command and established public policy.
Appellant does not argue that Condition 7 of the
insurance contract violates any statutory prohibition,
but Appellant does argue that Condition 7 does frustrate the intent of the uninsured motorist provisions
of Utah Law, and is contrary to public policy.
The reverse is true. Condition 7 is in complete
harmony with the Law and public policy of the State
of Utah relative to uninsured motorist coverage.
The provision of our Code relative to uninsured
motorist coverage is Title 41-12-21.1 adopted by the
legislature in 1967. This statute reads:
"Commencing on July 1, 1967, no automobile
liability insurance policy insuring against loss
resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death or property damage suffered
by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, shall be
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in this
state, with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state, unless
coverage is provided in such policy or a supplement to it, in limits for bodily injury or death
set forth in section 41-12-5, under provisions
14

filed with and approved by the state insurance
commission for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured
motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. The named
insured shall have the right to reject such coverage, and unless the named insured requests such
coverage in writing, such coverage need not be
provided in a renewal policy or a supplement to
it where the named insured had rejected the
coverage in connection with a policy previously
issued to him by the same insurer."
The purpose of this legislation was to alleviate the economic burden cast upon the injured by the
uninsured motorist. It was also designed in part to
head off a demand for compulsory automobile insurance. This is a more desirable method because States
that have compulsory automobile insurance have
found that such a Law drives the cost of insurance
premiums up to prohibitive levels.
The statute demands that a limit of $10,000 and
$20, 000 for a single accident be provided by the
policy under conditions approved by the State Insurance Commission. These are the amounts provided
in the policies in this case and there is no evidence
that the form of policy has not been approved by the
Insurance Commission.
Rather than frustrate the provisions of this section of the Code the policies in question conform exactly to it. This statute embodies the public policy of
15

this State relative to uninsured motorists and insurance coverage therefor and the insurance policies in
this case are not in opposition to the Law in any respect. Plaintiffs in this case have been afforded the
amount of protection provided by the statute and in
fact the full statutory limit has been offered to them
in settlement.

16

POINT III.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE HAS NOT
WAIVED ANY PROVISION OR CONDITION OF ITS
POLICIES.

The Farmers Insurance Exchange has not
waived condition 7 of the policy by issuing two policies and by accepting the premium therefor as contended by appellants. Appellants cite no facts that
would indicate a waiver in this case and the only
authority cited is 28 American Jurisprudence 2d,
Estoppel and ·waiver, Section 162. That Section
merely states that:
" (a) rights secured by contract may be waived
"
No-one can quarrel with that principle but it has
no application to this case.
Appellant should also be made aware of Condition 3 set forth in the insurance contracts which
reads as follows:
(3)

CHANGES:

"Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by
any agent or by any other person shall not effect
a waiver or a change in any part of this policy
or estop the Company from asserting any right
under the terms of this policy; nor shall the
terms of this policy be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a party of
this policy." (R. 14)
Waiver is generally defined in Law as "volun17

tary and intentional relinquishment of a known
right."
28 American Jurisprudence, Estopel and Waiver, Section 154.
There is no evidence in this case of a waiver, ex- '
press or implied, and the very terms of the insurance
contract negative any such intention on the part of
Farmers Insurance Exchange. Had there been an
endorsement waiving this policy term appellants
should produce it. Respondent assures the court that 1
no such endorsement exists.

18
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CONCLUSION
Condition 7 of the insurance contracts in issue
in this case limit the liability of the insurance company on any one loss to the highest single limt of any
one policy. Conditions such as Condition 7 are found
in almost every automobile insurance contract written in this Country.
Respondent in this case and indeed the insurance industry has a legal right to limit its liability
providing that the limitation does not contravene established statutory law or the public policy of the
State. The foregoing principle was in effect adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Russell
vs. Paulson, supra, as applied to the "excess clause"
and "pro-rata clause" contained in the policies of
different companies as applied to a single loss. The
same reasoning of that case should apply in this case
involving the limit of liability of an insurance company where two policies are issued by the same
company.
There is no evidence of a waiver by the insurance Company of Condition 7 of the policy and no
evidence that Condition 7 contravenes the Law or
public policy of the State of Utah. In fact, the policies in question conform strictly to the Law of the
State of Utah, and plaintiffs in this case have been
afforded the protection required by the statute and in
fact plaintiffs have been offered the fuU amount of
money provided by Law.
19

The decision of the Lower Court must be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
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